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ORANGE REVOLUTION IN RED, WHITE, AND
BLUE: U.S. IMPACT ON THE 2004 UKRAINIAN
ELECTION
NATALIE PRESCOTT*
Ukraine declared its independence from Communist Russia in
1991 . . . . This fall, elections were held that were fraudulent. More
than 200,000 citizens took to the cold streets in their orange scarves.
Their leader—sick, disfigured and in great pain for daring to seek
freedom—stood with them. The case went to their Supreme Court,
just like our 2000 election. In both cases, the courts ruled and the
people followed the rulings. . . . Ukraine now has a democratically
elected leader for the first time in more than 60 years.1

INTRODUCTION
In 2004, the Ukrainian Supreme Court followed the steps of the
U.S. Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore2 when it decided to lead the
country toward the resolution of the election crisis.3 The Court’s ruling in the Yuschenko decision resonated world-wide, resulting in a
victory for democracy and a bright future for American-Ukrainian relations. Yet, a major aspect of this decision has gone unnoticed: the
Ukrainian Supreme Court used this case to exercise its power of judicial review. As the United States Supreme Court did in the landmark
case Marbury v. Madison,4 the Ukrainian Court claimed the authority
to say “what the law is”5 for the first time. The United States has
Copyright © 2006 by Natalie Prescott
* Natalie Prescott is a J.D. candidate at the Duke University School of Law and serves as
an Editor-in-Chief of the Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law. She would like
to thank Professor Erwin Chemerinsky for his guidance and assistance with this Note.
1. Joe B. Whisler, The Rule of Law, 61 J. MO. B. 70, 70 (2005).
2. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
3. Id. at 111 (2000) (ending an electoral recount in Florida by reversing a judgment of the
Florida Supreme Court. The reversal resolved the disputed presidential election of 2000 in favor of appellant George W. Bush).
4. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
5. Id. at 177. (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and
interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation
of each.”).
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played a key role in this revolution by helping to shape the Ukrainian
democracy. But the lang uage barriers made it difficult for most legal
scholars to closely analyze this significant legal development.
This Note, therefore, provides procedural background to the Yushchenko case and explains how the Court’s decision was influenced
by the United States. Part I discusses the status of Ukrainian ele ctoral law prior to the events of 2004. Part II elaborates on the framework of the Yushchenko case, explaining the jurisdictional issues, the
structure of the Ukrainian judicial system, and the procedural history.
Part III demonstrates how American leaders foresaw the problematic
election, and what steps were taken to remedy the situation. Finally,
Part IV considers the potential consequences of the Yushchenko decision both for the Ukrainian judiciary and for the country’s prospects
of joining the European Union.
I. ELECTIONS BACKGROUND
The Ukrainian President is elected by popular vote for a fiveyear term.6 The election process is similar to that of the United
States.7 For example, Ukrainian citizens who are eighteen or older
have the right to vote.8 Unlike the polls in the United States, however, Ukrainian polling stations are supervised by official observers,
whose duty is to ensure a fair outcome of the elections.9 After the
votes are cast, regional protocols are prepared and delivered to the
Central Election Commission (CEC), which then compiles the results
and announces the winner.10

6. K ONSTITUTSIYA
UKRAINI
[Constitution]
art.
103,
available
at
http://www.rada.kiev.ua/const/conengl.htm.
7. Id. arts. 69–74 (polling stations are located in each district, and votes are cast by means
of secret ballots). Currently only paper ballots are used, but the 2004 Ukraine Presidential ele ction may have provided the government with sufficient incentives to invest in ele ctronic voting
machines. See Ambassador John Tefft, U.S. Will Work with Winner of a Free, Fair Election in
Ukraine, U.S. Info. State. Gov. (Dec. 8, 2004), http://usinfo.state.gov/eur/Archive/2004/Dec/08651072.html. Electronic voting machines were proposed in Florida after allegations of fraud in
the 2000 U.S. Presidential ele ction. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 104 (“After the current counting, it is
likely legislative bodies nationwide will examine ways to improve the mechanisms and machinery for voting.”).
8. K ONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI art. 70.
9. Central
Election
Commission
of
Ukraine
[hereinafter
CEC],
http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2004/wp0011e (follow “Official Observers from Foreign States and
International Organizations” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
10. See generally id. (for information on the election procedures and results).
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Presidential elections in Ukraine consist of two rounds.11 In theory, a candidate who secures more than fifty-one percent of the votes
could win based on the first round alone.12 However, this never happens in practice. No single candidate, including incumbents, has ever
won the first round by absolute majority.13 Verkhovna Rada (the
Ukrainian Parliament) houses a number of political parties, each endorsing its own candidate,14 and additional candidates run independently.15 This system results in the nomination of more than twenty
candidates, which makes securing outright majority virtually impossible.16 Thus, the top two candidates advance to the second round.17
Thereafter, the winner is determined by a simple majority vote.18
In the first round of the 2004 presidential elections, candidates
Victor Yushchenko and Victor Yanukovych received the two highest
percentages of votes, though both fell short of obtaining the needed
majority.19 Yushchenko, a pro-Western Democrat who ran independently, promised to take steps toward securing Ukraine’s me mbership in the European Union and improving its relations with the
United States.20 Yanukovich, nominated by the Party of Regions,
11. See generally CEC, supra note 9 (follow “Results of Voting in Ukraine” hyperlink)
(discussing the results of the two rounds of elections and the results of the repeated voting).
12. Id.
13. Id.;
see
also
Official
Website
of
the
President
of
Ukraine,
http://www.preside nt.gov.ua/en (follow “President of Ukraine” hyperlink; then follow ”The History of Presidency” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
14. See K ATARYNA WOLCZUK, THE MOULDING OF UKRAINE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
POLITICS OF STATE FORMATION 131 (2001) (discussing party membership in Ukrainian Parliament in 1994); see also CEC, http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2004/wp0011e (follow “Candidates to
the Post of President of Ukraine” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
15. CEC, http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2004/wp0011e (follow “Candidates to the Post of
President of Ukraine” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 31, 2005). Twenty-four candidates were
listed on the ba llot in the 2004 presidential elections, nine of whom, including Yushchenko, ran
independently. Id.
16. Id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. CEC, http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2004/wp0011e (follow “Results of Voting in
Ukraine” hyperlink; then follow “The Elections of the President of Ukraine, 31 October, 2004”
hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 31, 2005). In the first round of elections, Yushchenko received
39.9%, and Yanukovych secured 39.2% of the votes. Id.
20. Anna Melnichuk, Ukraine’s Opposition Scores Victory , CASPER STAR TRIBUNE, Dec. 3,
2004, at 34 (Viktor Yushchenko, who was a former central bank chief and prime minister “campaigned for president on a promise to forge closer ties with the West ”); see also Daniel Dombey
et al., Yushchenko Takes Over with Eye on Europe, FIN. TIMES, January 24, 2005, at 6 (in his
inaugural speech Yushchenko reiterated his campaign promise: “Our way to the future is the
way of a united Europe. We, along with the people of Europe, belong to one civilization. Our
place is in the European Union.”).
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promised to reestablish close ties with Russia.21 Because neither candidate received the requisite absolute majority, a second round of
elections was held.22 This second round became the basis of the 2004
world-wide controversy.23 Although Yanukovych won the second
round by a narrow margin, numerous factors indicated that his victory
was gained by fraud.24
The most significant evidence of fraud was a suspiciously high
voter turnout reported at over ninety percent.25 Ukrainians are active
in politics, and high voter turnout is not uncommon. 26 Every five
years close to seventy percent of eligible citizens vote in presidential
and parliamentary elections — a considerably high percentage by international standards.27 However, the single instance of a ninetypercent voter turnout was in 1991, when Ukrainians voted overwhelmingly for the nation’s independence.28 In presidential elections,
voter turnout never before approached the ninety-percent benchmark.29
Other factors further pointed to a fabrication of the results.
Many individuals were allowed to vote twice; thousands of absentee
ballots went missing, only to reappear in the voting bins shortly before the polling stations closed; and some citizens complained of
threats and coercion.30 In several districts, international independent

21. CASPER STAR TRIBUNE, supra note 20 (noting that Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych
“[c]ampaigned for the presidency on a promise to forge closer ties with Russia [and] received
strong Kremlin backing”).
22. See CEC, http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2004/wp0011e (follow “Results of Voting in
Ukraine” hyperlink; then follow “The Elections of the President of Ukraine, 31 October, 2004”
hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
23. U.S. Congressman Jim Leach called Ukrainian election “one of the semifinal events of
this new century.” 150 CONG. R EC. E2198 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2004) (statement of Rep. Leach).
24. Presidential Runoff Election in Ukraine, S. Res. 487, 108th Cong. (2004); see also EU
Urges
Fair
Ukrainian
Elections,
BBC
N EWS,
Oct.
1,
1999,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/europe/463192.stm.
25. See CEC, supra note 22.
26. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Voter Turnout,
http://www.idea.int/vt/country_view.cfm?CountryCode=UA (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
27. Id. Between 1994 and 2002, approximately seventy percent of eligible Ukrainians
voted in presidential and parliamentary ele ctions. Id. In the USA, voter turnout during the
same period hovered around fifty percent. Id.
28. Richard C.O. Rezie, Note, The Ukrainian Constitution: Interpretation of the Citizens’
Rights Provisions, 31 CASE W. R ES. J. INT’L L. 169, 183 (1999); see also Judge Bohdan A. Futey,
Comments on the Constitution of Ukraine, E. EUR. CONST . R EV., Spring/Summer 1996, at 29.
29. See International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance,
http://www.idea.int/vt/country_view.cfm?CountryCode=UA (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
30. S. Res. 487, 108th Cong. (2004).
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observers were denied entry into the polling stations.31 Additionally,
there were instances of assaults on electoral observers, illegal voting,
and usage of counterfeit ballots.32 A hotline , established by an independent U.S. organization, registered 7,476 calls from concerned citizens complaining about these violations.33
But the most egregious wrongdoing was yet to be discovered.
On September 6, 2004 Yushchenko reported to a local hospital.34
There were rumors that he was poisoned, but doctors were unable to
find traces of poison in his blood. 35 Only three long months later, after numerous tests and examinations in the best medical facilities,
doctors were able to conclusively establish that Yushchenko was poisoned by dioxin.36 He survived the attack and was able to remain in
the presidential race, despite numerous hospital visits and continuing
treatment.37 However, as a result of the poisoning, his face became
badly disfigured.38 Yushchenko and his supporters blamed this al-

31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See American Bar Association, Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative in
Ukraine, http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/countries/ukraine/ukraine_2004_elections_activities (last
visited Oct. 31, 2005).
34. Elizabeth Rosenthal, American Doctors Helped Identify Ukraine Leader’s Poisoning,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2005, at 13; U.S. Doctors Treated Yushchenko; Secret Team Helped Find
Dioxin, WASH. POST, March 11, 2005, at A01 (doctors initially suspected inadvertent food poisoning, but it soon became clear that poisoning was intentional).
35. Elizabeth Rosenthal, American Doctors Helped Identify Ukraine Leader’s Poisoning,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2005, at 13.
36. Id. Dioxin is “one of the most toxic chemicals known to science.” Dioxin Homepage,
http://www.ejnet.org/dioxin/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2005). There is no “safe” level of dioxin: it is
linked to cancer and is known for its ability to damage the immune system. Id. Dioxin is present in food, and most of it comes from the consumption of beef. Id. It is extremely difficult to
detect, as most laboratories do not have the necessary equipment and do not routinely test for
dioxin; moreover, in most people, levels of dioxin are not high enough to be detected. Questions and Answers about Dioxins, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~lrd/dioxinqa.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
37. See Elizabeth Rosenthal, American Doctors Helped Identify Ukraine Leader’s Poisoning, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2005, at 13.
38. Id. (“Mr. Yushchenko, who is still suffering from disfiguring cysts of his face, will need
long-term treatment for his skin, . . . drugs to help his body dispel the dioxin, [and] close monitoring for signs of cancer . . . .”). Presently, doctors are strongly advising Yushchenko against
plastic surgery. Id.
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leged assassination attempt on the opposition. 39 Nevertheless, there
was no physical evidence linking Yanukovych to the poisoning.40
Even after the U.S.S.R. relinquished its control of the state,
Ukraine had seen its share of repression.41 The government had always retained extensive control over mass media, and “many me mbers of the press have been murdered, after printing articles about
government corruption and theft.”42 Yet, never befor e43 corrupt attempts to secure presidency have been so extensive, so bold, and so
egregious.44
International organizations and foreign nations were stunned by
the events in Ukraine.45 News reports about Ukrainian elections
flooded the internet and television.46 The European Union issued a
public opinion, calling for a new and fair election,47 and the United
Nations called “on all sides to exercise maximum restraint and to re39. Security Official Denies Role in Poisoning, CHI . TRIB., Dec. 19, 2004, at 25 (“Yushchenko has accused the authorities of poisoning him in an attempted ‘political murder’ to
push him out of the presidential race, saying he most likely was poisoned at a dinner Sept. 5 with
Ukraine’s security agency chief . . . .”).
40. Doctors suspected the poisoning was intentional because Yushchenko’s levels of dioxin
exceeded normal levels 1,000 times, but they “would not speculate on the source.” See Elizabeth Rose nthal, Yushchenko Able to Serve, But Will Need Longtime Care, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27,
2004, at 12.
41. See Rezie, supra note 28, at 204 (discussing former President Kuchma’s blatant disrespect for the rule of law).
42. See id.; see also WOLCZUK, supra note 14, at 277-78.
43. With the exception of the murder of a Ukrainian journalist in 2000, which was linked to
the administration. See Kuchma to Be Quizzed Over Journa list’s Death, THE INDEPENDENT
(London), Mar. 10, 2005, at 21 (“Ukrainian prosecutors want to talk to former president Leonid
Kuchma as part of their investigation into the killing of a journalist . . . . Mr Kuchma’s opponents have accused him of involvement in the death of the investigative journalist Georgiy Gongadze, who was killed in 2000.”).
44. Reportedly, the Supreme Court Justices even “have been physically threatened to rule
in favour of Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych.” Stephen Mulvey, Tough Choice for Ukrainian Court, BBC NEWS, Nov. 29, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4051641.stm. In fact,
the names of the Justices were “kept secret until the last minute to protect them from outside
interference.” Id.
45. See INT’L ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (R EPEAT
SECOND
R OUND),
UKRAINE,
available
at
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNTC/UNPAN019428.pdf. (last visited
Oct. 31, 2005).
46. Inquiries about the Ukrainian Elections generated 4,730,000 hits on Google on December 17, 2005. See http://www.google.com (last visited Dec. 17, 2005).
47. Presidency Conclusions 16238/04, Declaration on Ukraine, Annex I, 2004 O.J. Benita
Ferrero-Waldner, Comm’r for External Relations & European Neighborhood Policy, Situation
in Ukraine: Address before the European Parliament (Jan. 12, 2004), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/ferrero/2004/speech04_506_en.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
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frain from divisive political statements that could endanger the stability of the country.”48 Members of the United States Congress recommended a new election.49 Finally, yielding to the pressure, on December 1, the Ukrainian Parliament passed a non-binding “noconfidence vote,” urging the Court to step in.50 Despite the worldwide political pressure, a lawsuit challenging the election results appeared to be the only viable remedy.
Resorting to the Administration was not an option, because the
President had no power to select the winner.51 As for the Ukrainian
Parliament, although it arguably had the power to act in the emergency circumstances,52 its involvement would have been detrimental
to either candidate. For Yushchenko, Parliament’s involvement
meant losing the election because Yanukovych, who was a Prime
Minister at the time, had substantial support of the Parliament and
the President.53 Likewise, a victory would be short-lived for
Yanukovych because there was a significant risk that Ukrainians
would revolt if the Parliament appointed Yanukovych the president.54
Consequently, after the fraudulent results were announced, Yushchenko immediately appealed the results to the Ukrainian Supreme
Court.55 He claimed violations of the election laws and asked the
48. Highlights of the Spokesman’s Noon Briefing, Annan Calls for Patience and Respect
Amid Court Review of Ukrainian Election, (Nov. 29, 2004), available at
http://www.un.org/News/ossg/hilites/hilites_arch_view.asp?HighID=174 (last visited Oct. 31,
2005).
49. See 150 CONG. R EC. E2138 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 2004) (statement of Rep. Davis); 150
CONG. R EC. E2198 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2004) (statement of Rep. Leach); 150 CONG. R EC. S12021
(daily ed. Dec. 8, 2004) (statements of Sens. Frist and Reid); Presidential Runoff Election in
Ukraine, S. Res. 487, 108th Cong. (2004).
50. Ambassador John Tefft, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for European & Euraisan Affairs, Testimony Before the House International Relations Committee: U.S. Will Work with Winner of a
Free,
Fair
Election
in
Unkraine
(Dec.
7,
2004),
available
at
http://www.usembassy.it/file2004_12/alia/a4120802.htm; Presidential Runoff Election in
Ukraine, S. Res. 487, 108th Cong. (2004).
51. See generally K ONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI arts. 102-12 (outlining the powers of the Ukranian president, which do not include the authority to select a new president).
52. See K ONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI art. 85 (pointing out that Verkhovna Rada [The
Ukrainian Parliament] has the power to remove “the President of Ukraine from office” through
impeachment).
53. See Tefft, supra note 50 (discussing “abuse of state resources to support the government’s candidate, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych [and] a near-monopoly of media attention
for Yanukovych”).
54. See generally Presidential Runoff Election in Ukraine , S. Res. 487, 108th Cong. (2004)
(describing protests of tens of thousands of people against declaring Yanukovych the winner).
55. Rishennia Verkhovnogo Sudu Ukraini [Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court] of
December 3, 2004, http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=n0090700%2D04. An
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Court for injunctive and declaratory relief.56 The lawsuit was met
with skepticism because the Ukrainian Supreme Court had never before declared an election invalid, nor it ever asserted its power to interpret the election laws.57 Nevertheless, thousands of Yushchenko’s
supporters, dressed in orange—Yushchenko’s campaign color—
gathered in the nation’s capital.58 They protested peacefully, although
the threats that the country would divide were circulating on the
streets of Kiev.59
Despite the very cold Ukrainian winter, protestors were on the
streets day and night, sleeping in tents and relying on food that was
delivered by international organizations. An independent Ukraine
had never before seen such determination.
On December 3, 2004 the Supreme Court issued a ruling, announcing that evidence of numerous violations ma de it impossible to
fairly calculate the results of the elections and ordering a runoff.60
While the Court did not go so far as to proclaim Yushchenko the
winner, his supporters rejoiced. Yushchenko subsequently won the
runoff election by a lead of more than two million votes.61 In his public address delivered after his victory, Yushchenko proclaimed:
“[A]fter the Orange Revolution, the country and the nation have
changed. Not only do we have an independent country, we have a
free country . . . .”62

excerpt
in
English
is
available
at
http://www2.pravda.com.ua/en/archive/2004/december/3/5.shtml (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
56. See id.
57. See Matthew Schofield, Ukraine Supreme Court Orders New Election, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 4, 2004, at A1 (“Beyond canceling a faked vote, the decision establishes
the Supreme Court’s independence, which had been in doubt.”); see also Matthew J. Spense,
American Prosecutors as Democracy Promoters: Prosecuting Corrupt Foreign Officials in U.S.
Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1185, 1188 n.15 (2005) (“[T]he Supreme Court of Ukraine showed unexpected independence in ruling against then-Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich’s attempt to assume the presidency through a corrupt election.”).
58. Tefft, supra note 50. (The protests began shortly after the preliminary results of the
second round of election were announced).
59. See Presidential Runoff Election in Ukraine, S. Res. 487, 108th Cong. (2004).
60. Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court of December 3, 2004, supra note 55.
61. Yushchenko supporters expected him to lead the runoff election by a wide margin;
however, Yushchenko led by a narrower margin, securing 52% of popular vote, which was nevertheless sufficient to secure victory. C. J. Chivers, Yushchenko Wins 52% of Vote; Rival Vows
a Challenge, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2004, at A3 (Yushchenko led Yanukovych by 52.06 percent to
44.14 percent).
62. Press Release, The White House, Vice President’s Remarks with Ukrainian President
Yushchenko
(Jan.
27,
2005),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050127-1.html.
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International media referred to the Court’s decision as a surprise
and as the new democracy in Ukraine.63 In front of the Supreme
Court, thousands of people gathered, cheering and waiving orange
flags.64 December 3—the day on which the Ukrainian Supreme Court
ordered a new, democratic election—was forever engraved in history
as the date of the “Orange Revolution.”65
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE YUSHCHENKO CASE
A. Jurisdiction and Composition of the Supreme Court
The Yushchenko case was filed directly before the Supreme
Court.66 The Ukrainian Supreme Court is the “highest judicial body
in the system of courts of general jurisdiction.”67 Its decisions are final and cannot be appealed.68 While the Court ordinarily hears appeals from lower courts, it has original jurisdiction over election matters.69 Importantly, even when the Court has jurisdiction to decide a
case, it must refer constitutional questions to the separate and distinct
Constitutional Court, which is the sole judicial body for deciding constitutional matters.70
The Yushchenko case was heard before a panel of nineteen Justices and the presiding Chief Justice.71 The Civil Division, which has
jurisdiction to decide election matters, currently has twenty-two Jus-

63. See, e.g., Brady Williamson, Ukrainians Decide Future-Sense of Momentous Turning
Point Marks Vote, THE CAPITAL TIMES, Dec. 27, 2004, at 1A.
64. Tefft, supra note 50 (noting that the protests began shortly after the preliminary results
of the second round of the election were announced).
65. Press Release, Vice President’s Remarks, supra note 62.
66. See Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court of December 3, 2004, supra note 55.
67. K ONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI art. 125.
68. Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court of December 3, 2004, supra note 55.
69. During a meeting with CEELI representatives, Chief Justice Yarema explained that
the Court decides election matters as the court of first instance, within five days after the case is
filed—as required by Ukrainian law. See Zustrich iz Predstavnikami Misii OBCE [Meeting with
CEELI Representatives], (Oct. 15, 2004)
http://www.scourt.gov.ua/clients/vs.nsf/0/EC4F7F0910EF3D77C3256F9D002AB6DF?OpenDoc
ument&CollapseView&RestrictToCategory=EC4F7F0910EF3D77C3256F9D002AB6DF; see
also Zakon Pro Sudoustriy Ukraiini, Glava 8, Stattya 47; [Law on the Structure of the Ukrainian
Judiciary , ch. 8, art. 47],
http://www.scourt.gov.ua/clients/vs.nsf/0/F7FE086C2BD85DD342256C9B003F1550?OpenDocu
ment&CollapseView&RestrictToCategory=F7FE086C2BD85DD342256C9B003F1550 (last
visited Oct. 31, 2005).
70. K ONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI art. 147; Rezie, supra note 28, at 171.
71. Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court of December 3, 2004, supra note 55.
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tices on the panel.72 The Court cannot deny certiorari, and hence the
docket is always full.73 There are currently 25,000 cases pending before the Civil Division alone.74 This means it may take several years
or longer for a case to be decided.75 However, the law defines circumstances under which the Supreme Court must give priority and decide
a case immediately.76 Accordingly, election matters must be decided
within three to five days.77 The Court may delay announcing its decision if it must certify a question to the Constitutional Court.78 However, in this instance, the Supreme Court chose to decide the entire
matter itself.79 Although it complied with the five-day requirement,
there is a question as to whether it violated the Constitution by deciding a constitutional issue without referring it to the Constitutional
Court.80
B. Yushchenko: The Landmark Decision
On December 3, 2004, the Ukrainian Supreme Court issued its
stunning decision.81 Citing numerous violations and instances of
fraud, the Court declared the actions of Central Election Commission
invalid and ordered a new runoff election to be held on December
26.82 This complaint was filed by Yushchenko’s representatives
against the CEC, and Yanukovych intervened as an “interested person.”83 Petitioners asked the Court (1) to find that the CEC acted
unlawfully during the counting stage, (2) to invalidate the CEC’s announcement that Yanukovych had won the second round, (3) to find
that serious violations of election law had occurred during the second
round of election, (4) to invalidate the results of the second round,
72. Meeting with CEELI Representatives, supra note 69.
73. Verkhovniy Sud Ukraini [Official Website of Ukrainian Supreme Court], Sudova Pra ctika: Sudova Statistica [Judicial Practice: Judicial Statistics], http://www.scourt.gov.ua (last visited September 26, 2005) (noting that 67,000 cases were filed with the Court in 2004) (translation by author).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See Law on Structure of the Ukrainian Judiciary , supra note 69, ch. 8, art. 47.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court of December 3, 2004, supra note 55.
80. See Futey, supra note 28, at 32 (relying on Chapter VII of Ukrainian Constitution to
conclude that the Supreme Court “can neither interpret laws, nor declare laws and acts unconstitutional”).
81. See Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court of December 3, 2004, supra note 55.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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and (5) to choose the winner based on the results of the first round
alone.84
Petitioners presented evidence of numerous violations of election law, instances of fraud, and other irregularities that occurred on
the election day.85 Not surprisingly, Yanukovych and the CEC objected to Petitioners’ request, claiming that even if violations did occur, they “did not impact and could not impact the results of the ele ctions.”86 The Court disagreed. After being presented with evidence
of fraud that it found to be credible, the Court granted the first four
of Petitioners’ requests, noting the following violations:87
1. The CEC failed to examine the regional protocols and to
check them for authenticity.
2. The CEC failed to comply with Article 83(6) of the Preside ntial Elections Act.
3. The CEC neglected to consider timely complaints of violations.
4. Some citizens were allowed to vote twice.
5. In many instances, ineligible individuals were allowed to
vote.
6. Absentee ballots were cast and delivered without due control
on the part of the CEC.
7. There were numerous instances of voting outside the designated poll areas.
8. Many independent observers were denied the opportunity to
observe the voting process.88
The Court concluded that these circumstances were sufficient to establish violations of Articles 38, 71, and 103 of the Ukrainian Constitution and Article 11(2) of the Presidential Elections Act.89 Because
it was “impossible to determine the actual will of the voters,” the
Court ordered the CEC to hold a new election.90 Thus, the Court
granted Petitioners’ first four requests but denied the fifth request,
noting that the outcome of the election could not be determined by

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court of December 3, 2004, supra note 55.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the results of the first round alone.91 Neither candidate achieved an
outright majority vote in the first round, and the Presidential Ele ctions Act specifically provide d for a second round of voting in such
circumstances.92
This decision was “final,” which meant it could not be appealed.93
However, a question remains as to whether the Court had jurisdiction
to decide constitutional matters.94 As some commentators have suggested, the Supreme Court “can neither interpret laws, nor declare
laws and acts unconstitutional.”95 Nonetheless, by finding violations
of certain articles of the Constitution and the Presidential Elections
Act, the Court effectively claimed the power to decide these matters.96 The proper procedure would have been for the Court to make
factual determinations and then refer the question to the Constitutional Court.97 However, the Court did not do so—most likely for
two reasons. First, due to obvious time constraints, it was impractical
to refer the question. Second, a referral would undermine the Court’s
authority in the future.
Like Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, the
Ukrainian Supreme Court Justices were concerned about judicial supremacy and felt that it was sound to assert the Court’s power of judicial review in a decision that the entire world was awaiting .98
Importantly, the jurisdictional issue was never raised by the Respondents. Perhaps they failed to catch this error, or perhaps they actually believed that the Court had the authority it claimed to have.99
It is equally possible that this was a tactical attempt by the Respon-

91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court of December 3, 2004, supra note 55.
94. See Futey, supra note 28, at 33.
95. See id. (interpreting Chapter VII of the Ukrainian Constitution).
96. See WOLCZUK, supra note 14, at 259-60 (pointing out that, although the Ukrainian
Constitutional Court “was conceived as a powerful institution,” it found itself in a vulnerable
position, often striving “to limit the impact of its rulings by carefully seeking out the middle
ground”).
97. See K ONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI art. 147 (“The Constitutional Court of Ukraine shall be
the sole body of constitutional jurisdiction in Ukraine.”). See also K ONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI
art. 150 (noting that the Constitutional Court has the sole authority to decide the constitutiona lity of laws passed by the Parliament).
98. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
99. See Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court of December 3, 2004, supra note 55.
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dents to curtail lengthy judicial proceedings.100 Finally, Respondents
may have simply desired a ruling from a more prestigious and authoritative court.101 Despite this failure to object to jurisdiction,
Yanukovich and his supporters continued to litigate aggressively,
bringing three additional complaints shortly after the Yushchenko
case was decided.102
C. Subsequent Cases
On December 24, 2004 forty-six members of the Verchovna
Rada (Ukrainian Parliament) filed a case in the Constitutional Court,
asking it to declare the Presidential Elections Act unconstitutional.103
In this case, Petitioners claimed that the Act violated rights and freedoms of Ukrainian citizens.104 The Act provided that all citizens had
to report to the polling stations in order to vote.105 Petitioners argued
that the Act violated the right of those disabled citizens who were unable to attend the polling stations.106 After hearing the testimony of
numerous experts, the court granted this request.107 The court held
that Article 6 of the Act restricted disabled citizens’ right to vote by
prohibiting voting outside the polling stations.108 Moreover, Article 6
requires certain proof of disability, which—in the court’s view—made

100. Yanukovych may have also believed that the Constitutional Court would easily give in
under pressure and rule for Yushchenko. See WOLCZUK, supra note 14, at 259-60.
101. Additionally, parties may have rightly believed that the Ukrainian people would be
more inclined to accept the negative outcome from the Supreme Court, rather than from the
Constitutional Court, since European constitutional courts do not receive the same kind of de ference as the high courts of general jurisdiction. See Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum,
Popular? Constitutionalism? , 118 HARV. L. R EV. 1594, 1601 (2005) (reviewing LARRY D.
K RAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL R EVIEW
(2004)) (noting that “constitutional courts of Europe . . . combine ultimate interpretive authority
with a high degree of insulation from popular opinion”).
102. See infra text accompanying notes 103-19. The first case was filed in the Constitutional
Court by the members of the Ukrainian Parliament, challenging constitutionality of the Presidential Ele ction Act; the second and third cases were filed by Yanukovych, who claimed CEC’s
non-compliance with the Act and asked the Court to order yet another runoff election.
103. See Rishennia Konstitutsiynogo Sudu Ukraini [Decision of the Ukrainian Constitutional Court] of December 24, 2004, available at http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgibin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=v022p710%2D04 (last visited Sept. 26, 2005).
104. See id.
105. See id.; see also K ONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI art. 46 (guaranteeing “the right to be protected in the event full, partial, or temporary disability”).
106. Decision of the Ukrainian Constitutional Court of December 24, 2004, supra note 103.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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it more difficult for disabled citizens to exercise their right to vote.109
The court thus declared Article 6 of the Act unconstitutional.110
On December 25, 2004, one day before the runoff election,
Yanukovych filed a claim in the Supreme Court.111 Relying on the
above decision of the Constitutional Court, Yanukovych claimed that
the CEC continued to act improperly, violating rights of disabled citizens.112 This case was Yanukovych’s tactical attempt to delay the runoff election or to invalidate possibly unfavorable results, so that Pa rliament could intervene and declare him the winner.113 However, the
Court rejected his claim, and used this as an opportunity to have its
own Marbury v. Madison moment.114 The Court pointed out that the
CEC had a right to require proof of disability.115 Thus, without specifically overruling the Constitutional Court—which it did not have
the authority to do—the Supreme Court issued a ruling that was, in
part, contrary to the Constitutional Court’s decision. Once again, the

109. Id. The Act provided that only citizens with “category I” disability (those who were
immobile) could vote outside the voting poll areas. They had to present notary -certified copies
of official documents, evidencing disability, or other various documents if notary was not available. The court found that this violated rights of those disabled citizens whose disabilities did
not fall under category I, and that the means required by the Act to prove disability were too
burdensome. See id.
110. Decision of the Ukrainian Constitutional Court of December 24, 2004, supra note 103.
One judge wrote a concurring opinion, pointing out that the court should have also considered
the right to vote via absentee ballots as the reason for invalidating the Act. Id. Another judge
dissented on the grounds that proof required to show disability was not burdensome, and that
local governments should be the one s responsible for encouraging and providing an opportunity
for the disabled citizens to attend the polls. Id.
111. Rishennia Verkhovnogo Sudu Ukraini [Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court] of
December 26, 2004, http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi- bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=n0119700%2D04 (last
visited Oct. 31, 2005). Refusing to accept the outcome of the runoff election, Yanukovych
claimed that this time nearly five million people—one tenth of the Ukrainian population did not
have a chance to vote. Chivers, supra note 61, at A3.
112. Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court of December 26, 2004, supra note 111.
113. Yanukovych, who was a Ukrainian Prime Minster at the time of the elections controversy, had substantial support of the Parliament and the outgoing President, and there were rumors that, absent adequate and timely actions on behalf of the Court, the Parliament would step
in and appoint Yanukovych the President. See Tefft, supra note 50 (discussing “abuse of state
resources to support the government’s candidate, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych”).
114. See Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court of December 26, 2004, supra note 111;
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular
cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other,
the courts must decide on the operation of each.”).
115. Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court of December 26, 2004, supra note 111. In
fact, contrary to the Constitutional Court’s view, the Court held that the CEC could require any
proof it deemed necessary. See id.
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Supreme Court indicated that it viewed itself as the hig hest judicial
body, with jurisdiction to decide all cases and to hear appeals from all
courts.116
On January 14, 2005, having lost the election, Yanukovych filed
yet another claim against the CEC before the Supreme Court.117 He
argued that the CEC violated certain rules and procedures in the December 26 election and asked the Court (1) to invalidate the results
and (2) to order yet another runoff election.118 The Court denied
both requests after finding that Yanukovych failed to meet his burden
of proof,119 and that the CEC had complied with the law.120 This line
of Supreme Court decisions not only resulted in a truly democratic
election, but also set a promising precedent for the assertion of the
constitutional power by the Ukrainian judiciary.
III. U.S. INFLUENCE ON UKRAINIAN JURISPRUDENCE
The U.S. influence on Ukraine began in 1991, when this newly
independent country commenced drafting its constitution. As one
commentator noted, “[c]onstitutions do not develop in a political
vacuum.”121 When a country is engaged in the constitution-drafting
process, it looks “to well-tested constitutional models and attempt[s]
to rebuild them in the context of [its] own geopolitical circumstances.”122 Ukraine turned to the U.S. constitutional model, which
has been tested by centuries of judicial opinions.123 However, the
U.S. Constitution was not the only thing borrowed by Ukraine in the
process. Substantial resources were expended by the U.S. government and nongovernmental organizations with the goal of improving

116. A similar assumption was made by the Supreme Court in the December 3 opinion,
when it decided the constitutionality of the CEC acts without referring the question to the Constitutional Court. See supra text accompanying notes 94-101.
117. See Rishennia Verkhovnogo Sudu Ukraini [Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court]
of January 20, 2005, http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=n0001700%2D05 (last
visited Oct. 31, 2005). Yushchenko intervened as an interested party. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.; see also Chivers, supra note 61, at A3 (“It was easier to make allegations . . . then to
demonstrate them with facts.”).
120. Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court of January 20, 2005, supra note 117. Importantly, international observers similarly “declared that the conduct of the voting on [December
26] was a substantial improvement over previous rounds.” Chivers, supra note 61, at A3.
121. Rett R. Ludwikowski, Constitutionalization of Human Rights in Post-Soviet States and
Latin America: A Comparative Analysis, 33 GA . J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 4 (2004).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 12.
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Ukraine’s judicial system and electoral process.124 Ukrainian judges
were educated on how to decide election controversies,125 and high
Ukrainian officials were “instructed” by the United States to refrain
from improperly influencing election commissioners.126 In 2004, it became clear that the United States succeeded in its goal of fostering
democracy in Ukraine and made the Orange Revolution possible.
A. U.S. Influence on the Ukrainian Constitution
The U.S. Constitution undoubtedly had an impact on the drafters
of the Ukrainian Constitution.127 Ukraine adopted its Constitution on
June 28, 1996, five years after declaring its independence.128 While
the drafters of the Ukrainian Constitution continuously debated over
its form, it was clear that the contents would be borrowed from the
U.S. Constitution.129 First, the U.S. Constitution was a model that was
convenient, well-known, and tested by centuries. Second, the U.S.
government spared no time, efforts, or money persuading Ukraine to
adopt a U.S.-modeled constitution. In fact, during the drafting stage,
the U.S. government sent representatives to the Ukrainian Parliament to participate in the constitutional debates, to assist the drafters,
and to persuade them to adopt a democratic version of the Constitution. The final version of the Ukrainian Constitution was, in fact,
very democratic.
The U.S. influence on the final draft of the Ukrainian Constitution is evident from substantial similarities between the two documents.130 First, both constitutions rely on the concept of separation of

124. Richard W. Soudriette, What Iraq’s Elections Teach Us About Democracy Building ,
HUM. R TS. Spring 2005, at 22 (“America has provided essential funding for elections and for
associated democratic practices—such as political party development, rule of law, civil society,
and governance—through the National Endowment for Democracy, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the U.S. Department of State.”).
125. American Bar Association, Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative in Ukraine,
http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/countries/ukraine/program.html;
http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/countries/ukraine/ukraine_2004_elections_activities (last visited
Oct. 31, 2005).
126. Tefft, supra note 50 (“[I]f the [Ukrainian] election once again fails to meet democratic
standards, there will be consequences for [U.S.-Ukrainian] rela tionship, for Ukraine’s hopes for
Euro-Atlantic integration, and for individuals responsible for perpetrating fraud.”).
127. See Ludwikowski, supra note 121, at 4 (suggesting that the “drafters in post-socialist
states looked most often to the liberal traditions of the United States”).
128. Rezie, supra note 28, at 170.
129. Ludwikowski, supra note 121, at 12 (noting that the Ukrainian Const itution “clearly
borrowed from the American presidential system” and the U.S. Constitution).
130. See Rezie, supra note 28, at 181.
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powers and provide for the three branches of government with exclusive executive, legislative, and judicial powers.131 Second, the U.S.
and Ukrainian constitutions list virtually identical fundamental
rights.132 Finally, both constitutions are considered “the supreme law
of the land.”133
First, and perhaps the most significant similarity between the two
constitutions is Ukraine’s borrowing of the U.S. principle of separation of powers,134 set forth in Articles V, VI, and VIII of the Ukrainian Constitution.135 Ukraine established this principle on paper and is
currently moving towards implementing it in practice (albeit not
without a struggle).136
As one legal scholar noted, in order to successfully implement a
separation of powers system, “a constitution must establish branches
of government that are not only separate but also coordinate and
equal.”137 Accordingly, the Ukrainian Constitution not only creates
the three branches of government, but also attributes exclusive powers to each of these branches.138 The president, although called the
“Head of State,” performs functions of the Commander-and-Chief,
similar to the U.S. president.139 The Parliament, similar to the U.S.
Congress, has legislative power.140 Finally, the judicial branch has the
sole power to interpret the law.141

131. Compare K ONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI arts. 75-112, 121-23 with U.S. CONST . arts. I-III.
132. See supra notes 147-54 and accompanying text.
133. Compare K ONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI art. 8 with U.S. CONST . art. VI, cl. 2. See also
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 326-27 (1819) (“The constitution . . . shall be the
supreme law of the land . . . and it confides to this Court the ultimate power of deciding all que stions arising under the constitution and laws of the United States.”) (emphasis added).
134. Compare K ONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI arts. 75-112, 121-23 with U.S. CONST. arts. I-III.
135. See Futey, supra note 28, at 31.
136. Communists opposed the separation of powers, arguing that it was “a lofty principle,
and that even in the USA the unity of the state power took priority over separation.” See
WOLCZUK, supra note 14, at 142. On the other hand, national-democrats “argued that the principle of separation of powers would be best adopted to the Ukrainian conditions in a preside ntial system, which denoted a div ision of powers between the legislature and a directly elected,
executive presidency modeled on the American system . . . .” Id. at 145 (emphasis added).
137. Futey, supra note 28, at 31.
138. See K ONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI arts. 75-112, 121-23.
139. WOLCZUK, supra note 14, at 240.
140. K ONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI art. 75 (“The sole body of legislative power in Ukraine is
the Parliament—the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.”).
141. K ONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI art. 124 (“Justice in Ukraine is administered exclusively by
the courts. The delegation of the functions of courts, and also the appropriation of these functions by other bodies or officials, shall not be permitted.”).
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The Ukrainian Constitution provides for a similar structure of
courts to that in the United States: there are district courts, appellate
courts, and the Supreme Court.142 Like the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Bush v. Gore,143 courts in “Ukraine took a decisive step towards the judicialization of political power, subjecting political disputes to judicial decisions, in order to resolve the power
conflict . . . .”144 However, unlike in the United States, there is an independent Constitutional Court in Ukraine, which has the sole power
to interpret the Constitution and to decide constitutionality of laws.145
Despite these minor differences, the separation of powers concept is
live and well in Ukraine, and most of the functions and duties of the
Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches are similar to those in
the United States.146
The second important similarity between Ukrainian and U.S.
constitutions is a similar list of fundamental rights and freedoms. The
Ukrainian Constitution contains “virtually innumerable” guarantees
of individual rights, most of which are borrowed from the U.S. Constitution. 147 For example, both constitutions have identical guarantees
of freedom of speech, religion, and movement; protection from double jeopardy; and the right to vote.148 Both constitutions are also similar in that they set forth some limitations on individual rights and
freedoms.149 The Ukrainian Constitution enumerates those rights
142. See K ONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI arts. 124, 125.
143. 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000).
144. WOLCZUK, supra note 14, at 240.
145. Id. at 240 (“The principle of the separation of powers was vindicated in the provision of
the Constitutional Court, which has given sole authority to constitutional jurisdiction . . . .”).
146. See id. at 247, noting that the Ukrainian Constitution “was far from an ‘innovative
leap,’ or ‘conceptual revolution’; it predominantly aspired to match and conform to uniform
standards . . . rather than to invent new ones.”
147. Anna M. Kuzmik, Recent Development, Rule of Law and Legal Reform in Ukraine: A
Review of the New Procuracy Law 34 HARV. INT’L L.J. 611, 621-22 (1993); see also Rezie, supra
note 28, at 207. For a list of Ukrainian fundamental rights, see Futey, supra note 28, at 32.
148. Compare, e.g., K ONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI arts. 21-68 with U.S. CONST. amends. I, V,
XXVI.
149. For example, in some circumstances the government may limit individual’s right to free
speech. See K ONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI art. 34 (guaranteeing the right to free speech, thought,
and expression but providing that legal restrictions may be imposed on the exercise of these
rights “in the interests of national security, territorial indivisibility or public order, with the purpose of preventing disturbances or crimes, protecting the health of the population, the reputation or rights of other persons, preventing the publication of information received confide ntially, or supporting the authority and impartiality of justice.”); U.S. CONST . amend. I; Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“[G]overnment may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions ‘are justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to
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that are merely implied in the U.S. Constitution, for example the right
to privacy, the right to family, and the right to education.150 Having
finally become independent, Ukrainians overemphasized the need for
a guarantee of “liberties that Ukrainian people never possessed.”151
Hence, numerous Parliamentary debates, amendments, and revisions
resulted in a very elaborate constitution.152 Enumerated rights in the
Ukrainian Constitution have become so expansive that one legal
scholar placed the Ukrainian Constitution among “the nine most
‘generous’ constitutions which list comprehensive social security, education, health care, work protection rights, and other socioeconomic
rights . . . .”153 Despite a concern that the rights may be too expansive
to actually implement, the Ukrainian Constitution does make “great
strides toward a democratic society.”154
The third important similarity between the two constitutions is
the supremacy of the Constitution over legislative acts and judicial
decisions. Both Article I of the Ukrainian Constitution and Article
VI of the U.S. Constitution provide that the constitution is the supreme law of the land.155 Importantly, neither constitution can be repealed or superseded by any law—it can only be amende d.156 Recent
decisions show that, although the supremacy concept is more estab-

serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels
for communication of the information.’” (quoting Clark v. Cmty. For Creative Non-Violence,
468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). See Futey, supra note 28, at 30 for a detailed examination of limitations on the rights of Ukrainian citizens.
150. K ONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI arts. 31, 32, 53.
151. Futey, supra note 28, at 29. For example, some of the rights that were denied to Soviet
citizens were the right to travel, the right to privacy, and the right to free speech. Id.
152. The Ukrainian Constitution was drafted by members of the Ukra inian Parliament, who
began deliberations and revisions of the constitutional draft immediately after the breakup of
the Soviet Union. See WOLCZUK, supra note 14, at 193. As the Eighth Circuit noted, the
Ukrainian government “changed fundamentally following the breakup of the Soviet Union.
The 1996 Ukrainian Constitution and a 1991 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religion provide protection for religious freedoms, and current citizenship laws encourage the existence of a
multi-ethnic country.” Fisher v. I.N.S., 291 F.3d 491, 493 (8th Cir. 2002).
153. Wojciech Sadurski, Postcommunist Charters of Rights in Europe and the U.S. Bill of
Rights, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 223, 233 & n. 63 (2002). Moreover, the Constitution provides that this list of rights is not exhaustive, and new laws may guarantee additional rights.
Ludwikowski, supra note 121, at 24.
154. Rezie, supra note 28, at 207.
155. Compare K ONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI art. 8 with U.S. CONST . art. VI cl. 2.
156. Compare K ONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI arts. 154-59 with U.S. CONST. art. V. In Ukraine,
amendments must be ratified by two-thirds of parliament. K ONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINI art. 156.
The United States Constitution can be amended by ratification from the States. U.S. CONST.
art. V.
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lished in the United States, it is similarly respected by Ukrainian
courts.157
The supremacy, separation of powers, and the fundamental
rights provisions are the three most significant concepts borrowed
from the U.S. Constitution. Minor differences in the constitutional
structure, variety of enumerated rights, and deviations of powers of
the three branches of government are relatively easy to reconcile.
While mirroring the structure of the U.S. Constitution, the drafters
had to expand the Ukrainian Constitution to tailor it to the needs of
the post-Soviet emerging democratic government.158 Despite this expansion, the substantial similarities between the Ukrainian and the
U.S. constitutions vividly portray the extent of the U.S. impact on the
Ukrainian Constitution.159
B. U.S. Influence on the Ukrainian Judiciary
The U.S. Constitution was only one of many ways through which
the United States influenced the Ukrainian judiciary. In the years
since Ukraine’s independence, various U.S. organizations have made
a significant impact on practices and procedures implemented by
Ukrainian judges.160 Even at present, many of these organizations
have offices in Ukraine.161 They conduct various activities, sponsoring seminars and educating Ukrainian judges and law students on
how to implement the “rule of law.”162 The “rule of law” is the concept enumerated in many European constitutions. One of its significant meanings is that the government can be sued for its acts—a concept previously unknown to the Soviet Ukraine.163

157. See, e.g., Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court of December 3, 2004, supra note 55.
158. See WOLCZUK , supra note 14, at 193.
159. See Rezie, supra note 28, at 181.
160. See International Cooperation (1994-2002) http://www.scourt.gov.ua (last visited Oct.
31, 2005) (follow “Mijnarodni Zvyazki” hyperlink, then follow “Uchast u Navchalnih Programah” hyperlink) (discussing the “Rule of Law” program, under which the Ukrainian Supreme Court and the U.S. Government “work together to strengthen the capacity of judiciary
and general courts’ staff”) [Hereinafter “International Cooperation”]; American Bar Association, supra note 125; Ukrainian Legal Foundation, Informational Resource Portal,
http://www.ulf.com.ua/eng/about.asp (last visited Sept. 26, 2005).
161. American Bar Association, supra note 125.
162. America and the Court: Interview with Justice Sandra Day O’Connor (C-Span television broadcast July 24, 2005) (discussing her involvement with CEELI and the successful development of the rule of law in Ukraine).
163. See Futey, supra note 28, at 30.
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The American Bar Association is one of the leading organizations providing legal training and financial assistance for such seminars in Ukraine.164 As a result of these seminars, Ukrainian judges
are now better equipped to decide cases, interpret the Constitution,
and even write dissenting and concurring opinions.165 The citizens are
beginning to trust the judicial system and are increasingly relying on
courts to decide many disputes for which they previously had no legal
recourse.166 More and more cases are being filed, and the Supreme
Court already reports that its docket is full.167 Other courts are
flooded with lawsuits as well. For example, in one of the recent cases
brought before the Ukrainian Constitutional Court, “[i]t took three
years to finish oral arguments.”168
The Constitution now plays an important role in many decisions.169 Similar to U.S. judges, Ukrainian judges interpret the Constitution by looking at its plain language and by analyzing the drafters’
intent and historical circumstances.170 This decision-making approach
was first articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Martin v. Hunter’s
Lessee in 1816.171
The Ukrainian Supreme Court has also been taking significant
steps towards establishing its authority as the highest court.172 It emphasizes in every case that its decision is final and binding.173 The
Court also went so far as to assume it has jurisdiction over all legal
matters.174 In the Yuschenko case, the Court declared acts of the Central Elections Committee unconstitutional, without referring the

164. See American Bar Association, supra note 125.
165. See id.
166. See Futey, supra note 28, at 29.
167. Sudova Statistica [Judicial Statistics for 2004], http://www.scourt.gov.ua (follow “Judicial Practice” hyperlink; then follow “Judicial Statistics” hyperlink; then follow “2004” hype rlink) (last visited Oct. 31, 2005). According to judicial statistics, the amount of claims that were
filed with or appealed to the Ukrainian Supreme Court has increased by forty percent in 2004,
with the Court having to decide 67,000 cases in 2004. Id.
168. Alexei Trochev, Constitutional Developments, Ukraine: Constitutional Court Invalidates Ban on Communist Party, 1 INT. J. CONST. L. 534, 536 (2003).
169. Futey, supra note 28, at 29.
170. See generally Official Website of Constitutional Court of Ukraine, Akti KSU: Rishe nnya KSU [Acts and Decisions of the Constitutional Court],
http://www.ccu.gov.ua/pls/wccu/P000?lang=0 (last visited Oct. 31, 2005) for a number of decisions interpreting the Ukrainian Constitution.
171. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 326-52 (1816).
172. See, e.g., Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court of December 3, 2004, supra note 55.
173. See id.
174. See id.
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question to the Constitutional Court.175 This unprecedented move
suggests that the Court views itself as a binding authority with the
power to decide all matters, including constitutional questions.176
On December 3, 2004, the Court had its own Marbury moment177
when it considered and invalidated acts of the government.178 This
decision was also an implied declaration that the Court has the power
to inevitably influence the outcome of the elections, and thus the very
makeup of the coordinate branches of government.179 While there is
no direct evidence that Justices relied on Marbury, or on any precedent for that matter, they all attended the CEELI seminars, and they
are most likely familiar with the U.S. landmark cases.180 Because the
Court’s legal database is not sufficiently updated, it is unclear
whether this was the first time that the Court undertook to declare a
law unconstitutional.
It is quite possible that Ukraine will create its own system of
precedents in the future.181 Efforts are now being made to translate
the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights into
Ukrainian, which may lead to a system of stare decisis.182 The cost of
these translations is sponsored in large part by U.S. organiz ations.183
Overall, the United States has played a significant role in shaping
the judiciary in Ukraine.184 Some factors already demonstrate that

175. See id.
176. See
id.;
an
excerpt
in
English
is
available
at
http://www2.pravda.com.ua/en/archive/2004/december/3/5.shtml (last visited Oct. 31, 2005)
(“The above circumstances give reasons to conclude that the violations of the principles of the
law of elections envisaged in Art. 38, 71, 103 of the Constitution of Ukraine and of the fundamentals of the election process envisaged in Art. 11 part 2 of the President Election Act exclude
any possibility to precisely establish the will of the voters.”).
177. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to
particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with
each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.”).
178. See Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court of December 3, 2004, supra note 55.
179. See id.
180. See America and the Court: Interview with Justice Sa ndra Day O’Conner, supra note
162 (noting that all Ukrainian Supreme Court Justices attended CEELI seminars).
181. See Ukrainian Legal Foundation, supra note 160 (discussing an implementation of the
system of precedents by Ukrainian courts for human rights cases).
182. Id. (“In 1999, the Ukrainian Legal Foundation launched a project providing for the
translation of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights into the Ukrainian language
and their publication . . . .”).
183. Id.
184. See id.; see also International Cooperation, supra note 160, (noting the steps taken by
the United States to educate the Ukrainian judiciary).
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Ukraine is moving toward a semi-common-law system.185 With the
proper assistance from the United States, Ukrainian democratic future and unbiased judicial opinions are realistic goals.
C. Role of the United States in the 2004 Ukrainian Election
The most important evidence of the U.S. impact on Ukraine was
the U.S. involvement in the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election.
Both the United States government and U.S. nongovernmental organizations played an active role in the elections.186 Undoubtedly,
Ukraine owes its Orange Victory in part to the United States.187
The United States influenced the Ukrainian elections in four
very important ways. First, for a year preceding the elections, the
American Bar Association sponsored seminars to educate Ukrainian
judges on the elections process and on the role of the judiciary in political elections.188 Second, the United States provided 147 independent observers to monitor the elections.189 Third, the United States offered help to the protestors and thus ensured that they were able to
continue protesting peacefully.190 Fourth, U.S. ideals and political
pressure positively encouraged justices of the Ukrainian Supreme
Court to decide the case fairly.191
Remarkably, the United States was able to for esee problems
with the election process in Ukraine long before this controversial
election took place.192 In 2003, the American Bar Association implemented a “USAID-funded elections project assisting judges, lawyers,
election officials and the general public in the run-up to Ukrainian
presidential election.”193 This project was launched through the

185. For example, it is not uncommon for Ukrainian judges to issue concurring or dissenting
opinions or to cite other cases or international law in their decisions. See, e.g., Trochev, supra
note 168, at 537.
186. See Presidential Runoff Election in Ukraine, S. Res. 487, 108th Cong. (2004).
187. The term “Orange Revolution” was coined by the media because Yushchenko’s campaign color was orange, and his supporters wore orange scarves and carried orange flags while
protesting the fraudulent elections.
188. American Bar Association, supra note 125.
189. CEC, supra note 9, Official Observers.
190. See generally Presidential Runoff Election in Ukraine , S. Res. 487, 108th Cong. (2004)
(for a discussion of the steps the United States government implemented to ensure a peaceful
resolution of the elections conflict).
191. See S. Res. 487; see also Tefft, supra note 50 (for a discussion of the steps the United
States undertook to ensure the fair election process in Ukraine).
192. See American Bar Association, supra note 125.
193. Id.
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ABA’s Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative (CEELI).194
The former United States Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor was actively involved in this program.195
In the year preceding the elections, CEELI held a number of
seminars for Ukrainian judges on the role of the judiciary in the democratic elections.196 Justice O’Connor, who took part in organizing
these seminars, noted that the “program was attended by every one of
the Justices” of the Ukrainian Supreme Court.197
Only two months before the decisive election, CEELI held “ten
regional trainings for judges on election legislation and its application.”198 The training sessions were a great success, with approximately seventy judges attending each session.199 When the time came
to decide the landmark case, the Supreme Court was prepared to
handle the issue.
CEELI also took active steps in educating Ukrainian citizens on
their right to vote,200 including holding classes and issuing public media announcements in the week before the elections and encouraging
Ukrainians to vote.201 Furthermore, CEELI registered a hotline
where citizens could report election irregularities.202 On election day,
the hotline had registered over seven thousand calls from concerne d
voters.203 According to CEELI, at least ten percent of the Ukrainian
population was denied the right to vote in the second round of presidential elections.204
The United States Government did not stand by passively either.
In light of the election problems and allegations of fraud, the United
States sent independent observers to Ukraine to monitor the electoral
process.205 Among the observers was Senator Richard Lugar, desig-

194. Id.
195. America and the Court: Interview with Justice Sandra Day O’Conner, supra note 162
(discussing her involvement in CEELI and her observations of the Ukrainian election).
196. American Bar Association, supra note 125.
197. America and the Court: Interview with Justice Sandra Day O’Conner, supra note 162.
198. American Bar Association, supra note 125.
199. Id. (“Each participating judge received training materials that CEELI had developed.
These materials were also sent to every court in Ukraine.”).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. American Bar Association, supra note 125.
205. CEC, supra note 9, Official Observers.
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nated by President Bush as the official U.S. representative.206 When
Yushchenko supporters began their peaceful protests on the streets of
Kiev, the U.S. nongovernmental organizations were among the countries providing food, blankets, and medical care to protestors. After
the second problematic round of elections, several members of Congress made statements concerning the Ukrainian elections. These
statements were entitled “Election in Ukraine,”207 “Stakes in the
Ukrainian Election,”208 and “Presidential Runoff Election in
Ukraine.”209
On November 24, shortly after the controversial second round,
Representative Jo Ann Davis noted that, “[r]egrettably, and despite
every effort we were told would be made by the [Ukrainian] Government for a free and fair election, the rhetoric was not matched by
the actions.”210 Representative Davis called upon the incumbent
Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, the Ukrainian Parliament, and
the Ukrainian Supreme Court “to conduct a thorough review” of the
elections, to investigate charges of fraud, and to hold new elections.211
In the event that the dispute was not resolved, Representative Davis
urged the Bush administration to “take whatever actions may be necessary to express [the U.S.] displeasure with the actions of the
Ukraine government.”212 History has illustrated that this statement
was not disregarded by high Ukrainian officials.
In his statement, Representative Leach used an even more condemning tone, referring to Ukrainian citizens “standing up against
forces of injustice and oppression.”213 He urged that “free elections
are not an issue on which the United States should” compromise.214
The following day, the Senate passed a resolution condemning the
widespread fraud and expressing support for a “peaceful and legal
settlement . . . that reflects the will of the people of Ukraine.”215
206. See Presidential Runoff Election in Ukraine, S. Res. 487, 108th Cong. (2004) (“Whereas
such reports of fraud were also echoed by Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana . . . an observer to
the runoff election designated by President George W. Bush.”) (emphasis added).
207. 150 CONG. R EC. E2138 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 2004) (statement of Rep. Davis).
208. 150 CONG. R EC. E2198 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2004) (statement of Rep. Leach).
209. 150 CONG. R EC. S12021 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2004) (statements of Sens. Frist and Reid); S.
Res. 487, 108th Cong. (2004).
210. See id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. 150 CONG. R EC. E2198 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2004) (statement of Rep. Leach).
214. Id.
215. Presidential Runoff Election in Ukraine, S. Res. 487, 108th Cong. (2004).
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The United States promised to work with the winner of a free
and fair election.216 Such actions, coupled with U.S. financial support
and the political pressure that the United States exerted on Ukraine,
greatly contributed to the fair outcome of the 2004 Presidential ele ction. 217
The Ukrainian Supreme Court followed the steps of the U.S. Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore by deciding to play an active role in the
outcome of the presidential election.218 In a unanimous decision, the
Justices declared that the results of the second round of election were
fraudulent and ordered a new runoff.219 Like Bush v. Gore, the Yushchenko case was a decision that shook the world and established
the Court’s power to decide elections controversies.220 Justice
O’Connor, who closely followed this hearing, commented on the unprecedented level of transparency during the hearing, noting that, for
the first time in the history of the Ukrainian Supreme Court the court
proceeding was televised.221 She also declared that the Ukrainian
election was a “success in our efforts to promote the rule of law and
the independent judiciary.”222
Without the multitude of ways in which the United States provided continuous support, the 2004 Orange Revolution—and a democratic Ukraine —would probably not have been possible. The
United States prepared Ukraine for cases like Yushchenko by helping
Ukraine shape its Constitution, by assisting the judges in issuing unbiased decisions, and by encouraging the Ukrainian Supreme Court
to assert its Marbury v. Madison power.
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF THE YUSHCHENKO DECISION
The Yushchenko decision resulted in two significant developments. First, the Supreme Court’s decision catalyzed Ukraine’s political relations with the West. Second, it strengthened the Ukrainian
Supreme Court’s authority. Today, the Yushchenko decision is one of

216. Tefft, supra note 50.
217. See id.
218. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000).
219. See Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court of December 3, 2004, supra note 55.
220. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000); see also See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is.”).
221. See America and the Court: Interview with Justice Sandra Day O’Conner, supra note
162.
222. Id.
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the most widely read documents on the country’s online legal database.223
The Supreme Court’s order to hold a new runoff election resulted in a victory for Yushchenko.224 The Court’s ruling was perceived as the first truly democratic event in the post-Soviet Ukraine.
However, Yushchenko’s victory “has been seen . . . as hostile to Russia,” which openly supported Yanukovych during the elections.225 As
Representative Leach aptly explained, “[f]or the KGB alumni who
dominate the Kremlin, Ukrainian democracy is more than an embarrassment.”226
By demonstrating its political stand as a democratic government,
Ukraine secured world-wide recognition and enhanced prospects for
EU membership. Joining the European Union has been one of Yushchenko’s long -term goals for Ukraine.227 Now, as President, he is
actively lobbying the European Community to consider Ukraine’s
candidacy.228 Yushchenko’s efforts yielded some success: recent polls
demonstrate great popular support among EU citizens for Ukraine
joining the European Union. 229 The European Parliament “has given
overwhelming support to a resolution that would offer a ‘clear European perspective’ to Ukraine.”230 However, the European Commission says that Ukraine’s membership is “not on the agenda,”231 and
Yushchenko announced recently that Ukraine does not plan to apply
for EU membership until 2007.232

223. See Zakonodavstvo Ukraini [Ukrainian Legal Database], Populiarni Dokumenti
[Popular Documents], http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?user=d (ranking the Yushchenko case among the most popular documents on the database) (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
224. Yushchenko won the court-ordered runoff election by a lead of 2.2 million votes.
Chivers, supra note 61, at A3.
225. Yushchenko
Urges
EU
to
Admit
Ukraine
(Dec.
11,
2004),
http://www.razom.org.ua/en/news/4934/; see also 150 CONG. R EC. E2198 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2004)
(statement of Rep. Leach) (“Differing with Russia may be politically awkward, but once the
flame of freedom is ignited, the U.S and other western democracies have no ethical choice except to stand up in support of the people of Ukraine.”).
226. 150 CONG. R EC. E2198 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2004) (statement of Rep. Leach).
227. Brief—Yushchenko: Ukraine Aims to Open EU Entry Talks in 2007 (Feb. 24, 2005),
http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-135898-16&type=News.
228. Id.
229. European Voters: Ukraine Would Be Most Welcome (Mar. 24, 2005),
http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-137241-16&type=News.
230. MEPs Raise EU Membership Prospect for Ukraine, Jan. 14, 2005),
http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-134156-16&type=News.
231. Id.
232. Brief—Yushchenko: Ukraine Aims to Open EU Entry Talks in 2007, supra note 227.
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Ukraine’s relationship with the United States has also improved
significantly. The runoff elections received significant support from
the U.S. Congress.233 Additionally, during just the first six months of
his presidency, Yushchenko met several times with President George
W. Bush, who reaffirmed his support for Ukraine’s democratic
goals.234
In addition to world-wide recognition, the Court’s ruling provided Ukraine with another important benefit. Similarly to Marbury
v. Madison, the Yushchenko decision is an implied declaration that
the Supreme Court can interpret the law.235 By undertaking to interpret the Constitution, the Court finally claimed the power available to
its counterparts in other democratic countries.236 For a country that
has been independent for just over a decade, this is a significant step
indeed.
The Supreme Court’s decision points towards a gradual establishment of an informal body of case law. Although there is no clear
system of stare decisis, the Ukrainian Supreme Court’s rulings are
published in a reporter, and the Court often refers to its prior rulings
and even sometimes considers decisions of other courts and laws of
other nations.237 With U.S. assistance, the Justices recently launched
a program educating Ukrainian judiciary on proper interpretation of
the law and proper observations of judicial proceedings.238 Efforts
have been made to translate European Court of Human Rights cases
into Ukrainian, so that Ukrainian judges can have access to a foreign
body of law.239 Additionally, more and more Ukrainian sources are
233. See 150 CONG. R EC. E2138 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 2004) (statement of Rep. Davis); 150
CONG. R EC. E2198 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2004) (statement of Rep. Leach) (“The Ukrainian ele ction . . . is one of the seminal events of this new century. As members of the American people’s
House, we are obligated to express our support for the aspirations of Ukrainians.”); 150 CONG.
R EC. S12021 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2004) (statements of Sens. Frist and Reid); Presidential Runoff
Election in Ukraine , S. Res. 487, 108th Cong. (2004).
234. See generally , Official Website of the President of Ukraine, News,
http://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/scrolls/news_1_1.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2005) (listing
the President’s scheduled meetings with foreign leaders); see also U.S. Congress Cheers Ukraine
Leader (Apr. 6, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/4417901.stm (last visited Oct.
31, 2005).
235. See supra notes 178–84 and accompanying text.
236. Decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court of December 3, 2004, supra note 55.
237. See generally Verkhovniy Sud Ukraini [Official Website of Ukrainian Supreme Court],
http://www.scourt.gov.ua (last visited Sept. 26, 2005) (describing cases in Ukrainian discussing
the Court’s deference to foreign law).
238. Ukrainian Legal Foundation, supra note 160; see also International Cooperation, supra
note 160 (noting the steps taken by the United States to educate the Ukrainian judiciary).
239. Id.
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translated into English. For example, the Central Elections Commission has recently launched an English version of its website.240
Because of these efforts, the Ukrainian people now have more
confidence in the administration and the judiciary. One of Yushchenko’s campaign promises was to fight corruption, and he now
has the Supreme Court to back him up. More and more cases are being filed in courts, demonstrating a rising level of confidence in the
government.241 Overall, the Supreme Court has gained substantial
power and support as the result of its landmark case.
CONCLUSION
The 2004 Ukrainian Presidential election was proclaimed “one of
the seminal events of this new century” by a member of the United
States Congress.242 The election controversy that divided the country
and almost shook its constitutional core was—for the first time in
Ukraine’s history—resolved by peaceful and democratic means.243
From the day of Ukraine’s independence in 1991 through election day in 2004, the United States played a crucial role in the development of Ukraine’s legal system. The U.S. involvement began at the
constitution-drafting stage in 1991, resulting in an elaborate Ukrainian Constitution that adopted the U.S. model. The U.S. government
also actively contributed to Ukrainian legal education by providing
Ukrainian law students with an opportunity to study abroad. The
U.S. nongovernmental organizations further supported the development of the constitutional process by funding Ukraine’s legal libraries, sponsoring translations of foreign case law into Ukrainian, and
organizing CLE seminars for local judges. Finally, the U.S. government, having sent independent observers to monitor the election, fur-

240. See Official Website of Central Election Commission of Ukraine,
tp://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2004/wp0011e (last visited Sept. 26, 2005).
241. See Verkhovniy Sud Ukraini [Official Website of Ukrainian Supreme Court], [Judicial
Statistics], http://www.scourt.gov.ua (follow “Sudova Praktika” hyperlink, then follow “Sudova
Statistika” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 31, 2005). According to judicial statistics, the amount of
claims that were filed in Ukrainian courts has increased by approximately thirty percent in 2004.
Id.
242. 150 CONG. R EC. E2198 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2004) (statement of Rep. Leach).
243. Futey, supra note 28, at 34:
In reaching a political consensus and adopting a constitution based on broadly democratic principles, the members of Parliament have taken a step toward securing
Ukraine’s place among democratic societies. Above all, as in previous instances, such
as reaching an accord on the constitutional agreement in 1995, Parliament and the
president solved their differences in a diplomatic and civilized manner, rather than
through the use of force. This is therefore an auspicious beginning.
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ther exerted political pressure on Ukraine’s administration to assist
the Supreme Court without undue interference. President Bush issued several official statements to that effect, and three congressional
hearings were held discussing elections violations in Ukraine.
The U.S. efforts resulted in an unprecedented level of transparency and effectively provided Ukrainians with an opportunity to vote
in a truly democratic election for the first time. However, the U.S.
government contemplated a mutual benefit, as it understood that its
involvement in the Ukrainian legal sphere would prove highly expedient in the long run. First, the 2004 election significantly improved
Ukraine’s chances of joining the European Union and bringing
Ukraine in line with Western ideology. Second, the United States has
firmly secured Ukraine’s support in the international political arena.
Most importantly, the United States can be certain that Russia may
no longer rely on Ukraine as its permanent political ally. Instead,
Ukraine—incidentally the largest country in Europe—has turned to
the United States for guidance.
Needless to say, Ukraine ha s also benefited endlessly from the
U.S. involvement. The Supreme Court has finally established its authority as part of an independent branch of government, as well as the
highest judicial body in Ukraine. The Court asserted its power to decide the validity of Ukrainian law in its relation to the Constitution.
In the future, the Court may further expand its power by adopting
such useful common-law concepts as the system of precedents and the
dissenting opinions. Already, polls indicate a significant boost in
popular confidence with regard to the Ukrainian judiciary. Overall,
the Orange Revolution—sponsored in part by the Red, White, and
Blue Nation—has been a great success for Ukraine and for the rule of
law.

